Democratic Elections And Fiscal Management In Ghana’s Fourth Republic, 1992-2016

ABSTRACT 

The Ghanaian state was ushered into multi-party democratic governance in 1992. Unlike its predecessors, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which shepherded the democratic transition has so far survived seven successive competitive elections and three turnovers of power from one democratically elected government to another, surpassing Huntington’s “two turnover test” the criterion for democratic consolidation. However, fiscal policy management by successive elected governments since the beginning of the Fourth Republic has failed to adequately respond to the democratic gains made by the state over the last two and half decades. Using the concurrent triangulation strategy of mixed methods data collection, this study investigates the interplay between democratic elections and fiscal policy management in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. The study reveals the existence of political business cycles (PBC) in Ghana’s electoral process since 1992. Thus, by overwhelming majority, Ghanaian voters support the proposition that since the inception of democratic rule in 1992, all incumbent governments had tried to manipulate fiscal policy for electoral advantage. This, they did by increasing public sector wages and salaries, scaling up of infrastructure development and reducing or relaxing their commitment in the collection of taxes, government fees and charges during election periods. Again, in almost all cases, this had led to macro-economic instability which led to reduction in economic growth and the economic well-being of the citizenry. Another significant revelation from this study is that Ghanaians had greater preference for infrastructure development when voting than any other consideration. Thus, infrastructure by far ranked the highest in terms of preference, leaving behind other key issues such as social intervention programmes, and wages, salaries and allowances of public sector workers during election periods. Finally, the study shows that Ghanaian voters under the Fourth Republic were both “myopic” and “rational” when electing their political leaders. Thus, voters’ myopic views on incumbents’ economic policies during election times underscored the existence of PBC in Ghana’s electoral process. It may also explain why incumbents won in the 1992, 1996, 2004 and 2012 elections. Conversely, their “rationality” and “forward looking” behaviour may also account for the electoral defeat of incumbents in the 2000, 2008 and 2016 elections despite attempts at manipulating fiscal policy for partisan, electoral and opportunistic purposes. The study proposes some recommendations to restrain incumbents from manipulating the economy, particularly fiscal policy during election periods. These include the formation of an independent fiscal institution such as the fiscal council to serve as fiscal watchdog against fiscal indiscipline and expansionary fiscal policy at all times, particularly during election times. Moreover, there is the need for the establishment of fiscal rules with clear-cut mechanisms of enforcement. The study also recommends strict adherence to all the norms of good governance and transparency such as the passage of the right to information bill in order to enhance fiscal accountability. Other recommendations include the proscription of the winner-takes-all type of politics being practised under the 1992 Constitution, introduction of a seven-year non-renewable presidential tenure to ensure reasonable fiscal policy continuity, enhancement of civic education for Ghanaian citizens and by legislation, strict adherence to a long-term national development plan by all elected governments.