Does the Public Policy Exception to Arbitral Awards cause inconsistency

In an ideal world, once parties pursuant to their agreement decide to submit their disputes to an arbitral tribunal, they have invariably agreed to be bound by the tribunal’s decision. However, in reality the unsuccessful party may wish to evade carrying out the award. To this end the New York Convention provides a remedy for the successful party. The successful party can enforce his award not only in the courts of the seat of arbitration but also in the courts where the unsuccessful party has its assets. However, the award must pass the public policy test of the enforcement state in order for it to be enforced in that state. The problem then is what constitutes the public policy of the enforcement state? Can it be precisely determined? Should the wish to simplify enforcement of awards put at risk the attainment of uniformity of enforcement? The public policy exception is a highly controversial exception to the enforcement of an award. The proper scope and application of the public policy exception is still debatable. This paper seeks to critically examine the judicial application of public policy exception.