Politics of Accommodation in Nigeria’s Federalism (1993-2007)

ABSTRACT

Most federations face the problem of accommodation, which mainly concerns the management of diverse competing interests within the system. There is paucity of studies that integrate issues of power sharing; revenue allocation and political restructuring that have militated against effective political accommodation in Nigeria’s federalism. The study examined how these contentious issues were managed within the period 1993-2007 towards achieving an effective and successful federal framework for Nigeria.          Data were obtained mainly from secondary sources.  These included archival materials, such as memoranda and reports from constitutional conferences, the Political Bureau, Political Reform Conference, committee on power sharing and rotational presidency and commissions on revenue allocation as well as past and present constitutions. The selection of materials was based on their relevance to the issues raised.  Content analysis was used within the framework of critical theory to interpret the data.        The study showed that the political elite were innovative in dealing with the problem of political accommodation only in relation to threats to their common interests. This innovativeness manifested in response to crisis situations, such as secession threats, electoral crisis and minority agitations. They included the creation of states and localities in response to the minority’s question, to ensure that no single or group of states was strong enough to threaten the territorial integrity of the country and to ensure even development. Power shift and the principle of rotational presidency, including the rotation of other executive offices in the federation, were endorsed by the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other major political parties to deal with the question of power sharing. These measures seemed to effectively resolve the question of federalising power at the centre even though they were still being contested. Furthermore, the success of these measures was limited by the practice of elite control of power in the name of an ethnic/religious group, satisfying the imperative of accommodation while creating a problem of public accountability. The ascent of particular elite was often in disregard of intragroup contestations thereby foreclosing negotiations at the sub-ethnic level.  The limits of the revenue allocation formula as an elixir for the challenge of resource control was reflected in the rebellion and revolt against self-appointed leaders and other elite by youth and women’s groups in the Niger Delta. The uprising against conservative Muslim sects by radical groups in the core north also underscored the contradiction between elite satisfaction and the severe poverty of the broad masses of the population in the midst of oil wealth. The Nigerian elite have been quite innovative in adjusting federal practice to improve accommodation of the various segments of its diverse peoples. Measures of political accommodation have, however, had limited effects because their implementation largely contradicts the requirements of rational planning and general welfare.  The issue of political accommodation requires strategic balancing of the demands of elite accommodation and public welfare for federalism to be successful in Nigeria.