Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management Between Kenya And Somalia

Abstract

The shift from diplomacy-based security to security-based diplomacy has been

attributed to the fact that generating a comprehensive response to transnational

terrorism since September 11, 2001 has proven to be difficult. Multilateralism and

bilateralism have been employed in security relations with regard to transnational

terrorism. However, the increasing transnational terrorist attacks; particularly

terrorist incidences in Kenya with attributes from Somalia have been increasing over

time. While the role of the military (as a security-based diplomacy actor) has

emerged in supporting foreign policy to promote security and deter transnational

terrorism, there seems to be a discernable gap on how each country employs

particular military engagement tools. The general objective of this study was to

examine security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management

between Kenya and Somalia. The specific objectives of this study focused on:

assessing the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and

Somalia; examining the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures;

assessing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing and evaluating the

effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational

terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The study was grounded on three theories;

neo-realism, post-modernism and new social movement. An exploratory research

design and descriptive research design were adopted. The study covered Kenya

(Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera) and Somalia (Mogadishu,

Kismayu and Ras Kamboni). The choice of these regions was centred on the fact that

they have experienced a series of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab insurgency. The

total sample size for the study was 400. Cluster sampling and purposive sampling

techniques were used to determine the settings and the participants. Data collection

was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions) and non-interactive

involving questionnaire and document analysis. A total of 350 questionnaires were

issued to respondents drawn from state and non-state actors, 20 interview guides

targeting key informants drawn from state and non-state actors and 30 respondents

from religious institutions participated in Focus Group Discussions. A pilot study

was carried out at Jommo Kenyatta International Airport and Kenya Ports Authority

in Mombasa. Moreover, a pilot interview and focus group discussion was done with

a group of leaders and members respectively, drawn from Holy Family Basilica and

Jamia Mosque in Nairobi. The reliability of the instruments was determined through

the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second

administration. The study instruments were tested for validity through consultations

and discussions with the supervisors and experts in peace and conflict studies for

validation. Data were analyzed by use of descriptive statistics, through quantitative

and qualitative techniques. The study found out that the security-based approach

involving KDF intervention in Somalia has not been effective in managing

transnational terrorism; counteradicalization programs are weak and disjointed and

civil society groups are not fully engaged in such initiatives. The study further

established that the structural capacity of intelligence sharing is weak, while border

surveillance strategies such as migration controls and technology use are fragile.

Overall, the study concluded that a more robust understanding of the effectiveness of

particular tools, such as terrorism prevention, is essential in delivering a securitybased

approach to counterterrorism that is balanced and effective. The study

recommended the need for Kenya to reassess its interventionist strategy in Somalia,

engage the civil society in counter-radicalization efforts as well as utilizing

community intelligence in the management of transnational terrorism.