The Effect Of Counterterrorism On Domestic Security: A Study Of Kenya’s Military Operation In Somalia

ABSTRACT

Globally, regionally and nationally states have used counterterrorism to end terrorism and enhance domestic security. Whereas some studies contend that counterterrorism ends or decreases terrorism, others argue it invites retaliations thus an upsurge in terrorism. Despite the debate, on 16th October 2011, Kenya launched “Operation Linda Nchi”, a preemptive military operation in Somalia to end Al Shabaab and bolster its domestic security. In June 2012 it terminated the operation and re-hated its troops into AMISOM. Against th at background tthis study sought to investigate the effect of counterterrorism on terrorists and domestic security by examining how the operation affected Kenya’s domestic security. Specific objectives were to: determine the frequency of terror events; determine the costs of terror events; and assess Kenya’s vulnerability to terrorism since the operation was launched. Descriptive and interpretative design was adopted to draw insights on the contribution of counterterrorism on domestic security. Data was obtained from unclassified government documents; books, news reports, journal articles, theses, and institutional reports and key informant interviews. Respondents were purposively selected from Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, National Police Service, Department of Defence, Ministry of East African Community & Tourism, private security, Red Cross, religious organizations, epistemic community, tourists and victims of terrorism using snowball method based on position, knowledge and experience of the operation and terrorism in Kenya. 69 key informants were reached upon data saturation. Through content analysis data was reduced to sets composing a variable. Some were quantified and tabulated to enhance explanation. The study found that between 16th October, 2011 and 30th June, 2015, 126 terror events occurred in Kenya against 9 between 1975 and October 2011; and at very high frequency even than in the United States between 2001 and 2011. Most of them were executed using light weapons such as hand grenades, IEDs, home-made bombs and AK47 guns than bombs and heavy missiles used before. There were 2,607 casualties of which 602 died while 2,005 sustained injuries in the 126 attacks. The year 2015 recorded the highest number of deaths by June alone. Massive destructions of police and KDF vehicles and premises, entertainment clubs, religious places and humanitarian property occurred. Tourism returns fell by 7% in 2014. Several hotels closed down. Unemployment rate rose to 40%. Domestic radicalization and terrorist cells rose up. Workplaces, public transport, religious places and certain residential areas in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, and Mandera were perceived to be more insecure due to terrorism. The findings point to the antithesis of the pre-emptive neutralization theory which contends that counterterrorism ends terrorism or decreases terrorism since the operation was followed by an upsurge in terrorism in Kenya. The study concludes that counterterrorism invites retaliations and upsurge in terrorism thus deteriorates domestic security and recommends that Kenyan should: upscale its intelligence to enhance its ability to detect and intercept terrorists and weapons; cushion susceptible youth from radicalization; beef up security of targets; and review its policy holding KDF forces in Somalia. The public to build resilience. Research with scope beyond June 2015 incorporating classified information be done to advance the conclusions of this study and the intellectual debate.