WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR JURISPRUDENCE

ABSTRACT

The meaning of an expression, or relation between words in general language usage is

ascertainable if the special use of language is understood. A major criticism leveled against

the language of law has been the idea that the language of law is indecipherable and barely

understood by those outside the legal terrain. Most of the criticisms range from the alleged

incoherence nature of the language of law, the classified nature of the language of the law,

and the technical/restricted nature of the language of law. In clearing these bugs of

misconception from the eyes of the critics, this work explores various ideas of Wittgenstein

in finding appropriate solutions. This becomes the thrust of this work. In showing how

Wittgenstein exonerates the language of law from these vilifying attacks, he thought that a

word has its meaning only within the context of its use in a language and, its form of life.

From his language-game thesis which forms one of the major bedrock in understanding

Wittgenstein’s language ideas, one would readily understand that in order to comprehend the

language of law, one must participate in the language game of lawyers. This is not a

manipulation of language or of words. Participation in the language game constitutes a

special way which enables one, within a language structure, and, with the assistance of the

rules of the language, to understand the rational core of the designations of certain

terminologies and concepts. In connection with law however, participation in the languagegame

allows one to be cognitive of the normative meaning of such designations.

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